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NCAA v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA: THE
NCAA'S TELEVISION PLAN IS
SACKED BY THE
SHERMAN ACT
Until the late 1950's, all sports were considered to be exempt from the
antitrust prohibitions of the Sherman Act.' In 1958, however, the United
States Supreme Court, in International Boxing Club v. United States,2 held
that there was nothing in the nature of a sports organization itself to merit
an exemption from liability under the Sherman Act.' Despite the increased
scrutiny of professional sports organizations under the antitrust laws, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) continued to elude Sher-
man Act challenges by virtue of its status as a nonprofit, self-regulatory or-
ganization that was primarily involved in promoting amateur competition,
rather than in a purely commercial activity of the type traditionally regu-
lated by the Sherman Act.
This defense weakened, however, as courts increasingly considered the ap-
plicability of antitrust laws to many economic associations primarily con-
cerned with objectives other than a maximization of profits.4 By the late
1970's, the courts had made it abundantly clear that anticompetitive conduct
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)). In Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922), the Supreme Court granted baseball an antitrust exemption. Though the decision
applied only to baseball, it characterized the treatment of sports organizations under the Sher-
man Act for three and one half decades. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS
477 (1979).
2. 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (contracts resulting in exclusive control of all "world champion-
ship" boxing matches by one promoter violated the Sherman Act).
3. Id. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, at 763. See also Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
4. Several courts have examined the application of antitrust laws in primarily noncom-
mercial settings. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (medical
regulatory associations); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978) (professional organizations); Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 593 (1961) (trade associations); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (labor
unions); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (NCAA's traditional regulation
of "on field" activites, upholding NCAA bylaw limiting the number of assistant coaches per
school); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (educational regula-
tory associations); Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1981).
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outside of the usual business context was not immune from antitrust law,5
and that even traditionally noncommercial activities that were anticompeti-
tive would be subject to review under the Sherman Act.6 By 1977, the
NCAA was thus aware of the antitrust implications of many of its policies,
especially its controls on televised college football.
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma,7 the United States Supreme Court further defined and
clarified the scope of the Sherman Act in relation to amateur sports and
noncommercial organizations. The Court considered whether the NCAA's
television regulations and contracts constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The majority applied a
"rule of reason" analysis,9 in recognition of the special nature of college foot-
ball and the NCAA. 1° The Court held that the NCAA's television plan
constituted illegal price fixing and that it established horizontal market re-
straints blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to consumer
preference.1" Further, the Court ruled that these deviations from competi-
5. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
6. See Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics. An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655,
664 n.44 (1978). The "traditionally noncommercial" doctrine which originated in Marjorie
Webster Junior College, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), drew a
distinction between ordinary commercial enterprises and combinations having other than com-
mercial objectives. Id. Judge Bazelon stated that, in the case of organizations that normally
have noncommercial objectives, an "incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose
to affect the commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant application of the
antitrust laws." Id. at 654.
7. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
8. Greene, Antitrust Law, The High Court Updates Rulebook for Broadcasting College
Football, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 20, col. 1. See infra note 34.
9. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 104 S. Ct. at 2962. For
general discussion of the rule of reason in a sports context, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
supra note 1, at 769. There is no presumption of reasonableness under the rule of reason, and
the plaintiff must demonstrate that a practice violates the Sherman Act.
[I]t must be established that the rule restrains trade and. . . the restraint is unrea-
sonable . . . in light of the justification which the defendants have established. ...
In considering the strength of the [defendant's] justification, the court should be
willing to receive some evidence that there are less restrictive mechanisms which
could be used to effect [its] goals. ...
The greater the adverse economic impact, the stronger must be the objectives
which are being pursued.
Id. at 770 (footnotes omitted). See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
10. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960-61. In the decision to apply the rule of reason,
Justice Stevens stated that, "what is critical is that this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all." Id. at
2961.
11. Id. at 2971. The Court held that price was higher and output lower than they would
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tive free market operation were not justified by a compelling demonstration
that the plan's controls served any legitimate procompetitive purpose, either
for intercollegiate football1 2 or within the college football television
market. 13
The NCAA has played a strong role in the regulation of intercollegiate
sports since its inception in 1905.14 Its most influential role, however, argua-
bly has been in the regulation of college football and football telecasts. Foot-
ball is the only sport in which the NCAA takes a direct role in regulating
television coverage of the competition between member schools.15
The first college football game was televised in 1938. By 1953, with its
members fearful of reduced live attendance resulting from expanding televi-
sion coverage, the NCAA had begun to limit college football telecasts.16
Since then, the NCAA has regulated television coverage under a series of
network contracts, but only since 1977 has the NCAA proceeded without
the approval of its full membership.' 7 Dissatisfied with many aspects of the
NCAA's management of college football, some of the organization's larger
members formed the College Football Association (CFA) 18 in 1979 with the
be in an open market, and were unresponsive to consumer preference. Justice Stevens high-
lighted the significance of consumer preference in stating that "Congress designed the Sherman
Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.' " Id. at 2964 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).
12. Id. at 2969-70. Justice Stevens stated that "the NCAA controls utterly destroy free
market competition" within the college football television market. Id. at 2963 n.30 (quoting
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1318 (W.D.
Okla. 1982)).
13. Id. Justice Stevens also noted that it seemed unlikely that "there would have been any
greater disparity between the football prowess of Ohio State University and that of Northwest-
ern University in recent years without the NCAA's television plan." Id. at 2969 n.62.
14. Id. at 2954. The NCAA promulgates standards of amateurism, academic eligibility,
recruitment of athletes and rules governing the size of athletic squads and coaching staffs. It
also conducts national tournaments in a number of sports, though not in college football. Id.
15. Basketball is the only other college sport with regular television coverage and arrange-
ments are made by the individual schools or their conferences. See Board of Regents of Uni-
versity of Oklahoma v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
16. The 1953 plan limited coverage to one college football game per week in each area,
with three weekends of total blackout during the season. Id. at 1283.
17. Since 1977, the NCAA's Television Committee had distributed "Principles of Negoti-
ation" to the membership for comment. The "Principles" outlined the general approach that
the committee would use in negotiating the plan. The NCAA Television Committee solicited
suggestions from the membership and develop the foundation of a television plan. Those prin-
ciples were voted on, by mail referendum, and, if approved, used as the basis for negotiation by
the NCAA Television Committee. The Committee, however, has made substantial departures
from the "Principles" without approval of the NCAA membership. The NCAA's members
thus operated under television plans that they had not specifically approved. Id. at 1283.
18. The CFA includes five of the major conferences: the Big 8 (with schools in Nebraska,
Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Iowa, and Colorado); Southeastern (Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Kentucky); Southwest (Arkansas and Texas); Atlantic
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primary goal of increasing the role of its member schools in determining
television policy.19 The CFA attempted to sign a new television contract,
separate from the NCAA's plan. The NCAA responded by threatening the
CFA's members with sanctions in all NCAA regulated sports if they joined
the CFA's football television pact.E" As a direct result of the NCAA's activ-
ities against the CFA,21 the Universities of Georgia and Oklahoma filed suit,
charging that the NCAA television plan was an agreement among competi-
tors to fix prices and reduce output, and that it constituted an illegal group
boycott-per se violations of the Sherman Act.2 E The plaintiffs requested
injunctive relief under the Clayton Act.23
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
Coast (Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia); and the Western
Athletic Conference (Wyoming, New Mexico, California, Hawaii, Texas, Utah, and Colo-
rado). It also includes major independents like Notre Dame, Penn State, Pittsburgh, Army,
and Navy. Id. at 1285. The PAC 10 (Pacific Coast) and Big 10 (Midwest) conferences make
up the majority of major college football powers that refrained from joining the CFA. 546 F.
Supp. at 1285.
19. A special convention of the NCAA was, in fact, held in December 1981 to address
CFA members' grievances. As a result of this meeting, Division I was divided, for football
purposes, into Divisions I-A (95 major colleges) and I-AA (smaller programs). This did not
totally mollify the major schools, whose additional proposals to change the football television
plan and further restructure the NCAA were defeated. Id. at 1287.
At the 1985 NCAA convention, however, the 105 major football schools were granted au-
tonomy in all areas except championship events, financial aid and basketball. Though the
large universities can now approve football policies without interference from smaller schools,
few observers believe that the change will have any major impact on the game of college foot-
ball. See Asher, College Football Powers Win Limited Autonomy, Wash. Post., Jan. 16, 1985,
at C2, col. 4.
20. The executive director of the NCAA stated that any school signing the CFA's con-
tract with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) would be in violation of the NCAA's
rules, and also threatened to expedite disciplinary measures against any CFA members who
signed the NBC contract. The NCAA made it clear that its sanctions, ranging from repri-
mand to expulsion, would affect a school's entire athletic program, not just football. Id. at
1286-87.
Georgia, Oklahoma, and other major football powers believed that they could command
more money, and more appearances per season, if they were not restricted by the NCAA
contracts. They did not, however, want to resign from the NCAA because they still wished to
participate in all other NCAA sanctioned sports. Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, Intercollegiate
Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of
Agreements Among Colleges, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 717, 720 (1984).
21. The CFA did provisionally contract with NBC for the 1982-1985 television rights,
but, at least partially due to the NCAA's threatened sanctions, enough CFA members with-
drew their support before final approval that the contract was terminated. 546 F. Supp. at
1286-87.
22. Id. at 1282. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. For an explanation of the per se
rule, see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
23. The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1982)).
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held for the plaintiff universities.2 4 The district court concluded that the
NCAA was a "classic cartel" engaging in per se violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act by fixing prices for the telecasts, organizing group boycotts
against potential broadcasters, and placing an artificial limit on the produc-
tion of college football broadcasts.25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's ruling.26 The circuit court held that the NCAA's television con-
trols constituted both per se illegal price fixing and horizontal market
restraints. 27 The court stated that these violations amounted to illegal con-
trols on price and output, even under a rule of reason test, because they were
not justified by any procompetitive market impact.28
The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two decision, affirmed the court of ap-
peals and held the NCAA television plan invalid.29 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Stevens applied a rule of reason analysis3 ° in upholding the Tenth
Circuit's decision that the NCAA television plan imposed horizontal re-
straints on price and output, 3 1 thereby violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a dissent maintaining
that the majority improperly ignored the noncommercial context in which
the restraints were imposed.3 2 Justice White emphasized that when the
noneconomic goals of the organization were factored into the rule of reason
analysis, the NCAA's television plan seemed "eminently reasonable." 33
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court's decision to apply a rule of
reason, rather than a per se test, for determining violations of the Sherman
24. Board of Regents, 456 F. Supp. at 1281-82.
25. Id. at 1304-13. Judge Burciaga held that the NCAA's cartel enforced a group boycott
against broadcasters outside the plan, and against member schools who, were they to defy the
plan and sell their television rights individually, would be the subject of a group boycott in
athletic competition. Id. at 1295.
26. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1162 (10th
Cir. 1983).
27. Id. at 1152-56. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the
district court's finding of an illegal group boycott. The court of appeals stated that the plan
did not represent an effort to shield the NCAA from competition of broadcasters, and that the
existence of an expulsion sanction in a membership association did not represent a group boy-
cott. Id. at 1160-61. The issue was not considered by the Supreme Court.
28. Id. at 1157-60.
29. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2954.
30. Id. at 2962. See supra note 10.
31. Horizontal restraints are "agreement[s] among competitors on the way in which they
will compete with each other." Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2959 (1984). See also Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694-96 (1978).
32. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2971 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2978.
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Act. The Note will also examine the Court's holding that the NCAA televi-
sion contracts violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, even under the flexible
rule of reason analysis. It compares the Court's holding to the views ex-
pressed in Justice White's dissenting opinion, and to the lower court deci-
sions. The Note concludes that the Court's appropriate application of the
Sherman Act under a rule of reason standard will promote the growth of
college football, while establishing a greater competitive balance between the
NCAA's Division 1A football playing members.
I. THE SLOW EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT AS APPLIED TO
NONCOMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Applying the Sherman Act in Commercial Settings
The Sherman Act, which became law in 1890, prohibits "every contract,
combination. . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States . . . ."" The Act was designed to preserve free and unfet-
tered competition.35 It rests on the principle that unrestrained competitive
forces yield the best allocation of economic resources, the lowest prices and
the highest quality, while producing an economic environment compatible
with our democratic, political, and social institutions.36
Despite the comprehensive sweep of the statutory language, the Sherman
Act's application in the economy has turned on judicial interpretation ad-
dressing the practical meaning of the Act's unequivocal words. In Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey,3 7 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that, if strictly construed, the Sherman Act would prohibit virtually all busi-
34. The principal substantive provisions of the Sherman Act are §§ 1 and 2. Section 1
provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. . . .Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy declared . . . to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ...
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony. ...
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
35. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (land sales by a rail-
road that included "tying agreements," which guaranteed that the resultant crops grown on
the land would be shipped on the seller's lines, was per se violation of the Sherman Act).
36. Id. See Rivkin, Sports Leagues and Antitrust Laws, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS, 387, 388 (R. Noll, ed., 1974).
37. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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ness transactions.3 8 Common stockholders of a number of petroleum com-
panies affiliated with Standard Oil had sought to consolidate their holdings
under one corporation.3 9 The Court determined that although the consoli-
dated corporation would technically have a much larger share of the market,
the commonly owned individual corporations had long been functioning
jointly and therefore the transfer would have no real effect on the market.
Recognizing that only combinations and contracts that "unreasonably" re-
strain trade violated the Sherman Act,4° the Court necessarily narrowed the
scope of antitrust liability to allow the consolidation.
Even before the Standard Oil decision, courts had found that some types
of anticompetitive restraints that were ancillary to trade agreements might
foster competition, while other mechanisms, such as price fixing combina-
tions, should always be prohibited by the Act.4 ' Because the courts and
commentators have never agreed whether the Sherman Act was meant to
protect competition for its own sake, to maximize efficiency, or to achieve
other ends, the judicially created distinctions between anticompetitive prac-
tices are still being actively debated.42 The courts have struggled to define
workable standards by which to evaluate the wide variety of anticompetitive
situations.
The Supreme Court set out the basic guidelines for examining market re-
straints in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.43 The Chicago Board's
"call rule" amounted to an agreement among its 1600 members to set mar-
ket prices at the end of the business day in order to guarantee a common
price for all transactions made before the market opened the next morning.
In analyzing the "call rule," the Court reasoned that a restraint should be
examined to ascertain whether it "merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
38. Id. at 6-8.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id. at 63.
41. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898). Judge
(later Chief Justice) Taft argued that if an anticompetitive effect was incident to a main pur-
pose that would join competitors in a successful business that was useful to the community, it
should not be illegal per se. Id. at 283. However, Judge Taft encouraged drawing antitrust
lines to avoid creating a "sea of doubt." Id. at 284. See also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 264 (1978). Judge Bork adds that some elimina-
tion of competition may involve productive activities, and may be capable of producing eco-
nomic efficiency. Thus, some "ancillary restraints" that create efficiency should be allowed by
the courts. Id.
42. Note, supra note 4, at 806 n.32.
43. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Chicago Board of Trade is generally considered to be the seminal
case with respect to classic rule of reason analysis.
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competition. '"44 The Court listed the history of the restraint, the rationale
for its adoption, the negative effects believed to exist, and the end sought as
factors a court should consider.45 After weighing these factors, the Court
upheld the Board's "call rule" as necessary to the conduct of business.
Although the Sherman Act forbids only unreasonable restraints of trade,
certain practices have been found to be per se violations of the law-thus
requiring no elaborate inquiry into the precise harm caused or the business
reasons for their use. 46 The Court has found price fixing,47 group boy-
cotts,4" and horizontal restraints among competing sellers limiting the avail-
ability of their products, 49 to be per se violations of the Act. The Court will
often classify a business practice as illegal per se if it has had considerable
experience with an industry,5" but it has been willing to make a more de-
tailed rule of reason inquiry when examining new fields or unique
circumstances.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,5 the Court held that even price fixing52
44. Id. at 238.
45. Id.
46. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 4-5. The Court stated that:
[T]here are certain agreements . . . which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unrea-
sonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused. . . . [This] avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and pro-
longed economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved. . . an
inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id. at 5. See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977);
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972). Application of a per se rule reflects
the judgment that an individual determination of reasonableness is not worthwhile.
The decision to declare a practice illegal per se usually rests on two criteria; (1) in all but a
small percentage of cases the anticompetitive harm outweighs any possible benefit, and (2) any
attempt to identify possible procompetitive situations will waste judicial resources and add
costly elements of uncertainty to the law. Note, supra note 6, at 665.
47. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (intentional restriction
of output to increase price by a combination of oil companies operating in the Midwest vio-
lated § 1 of the Sherman Act).
48. Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (conspiracy by large stores and
distributors not to sell to a retailer, or to sell only at high prices or on unfavorable terms,
constituted a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act).
49. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (grocery store chain limiting
competition among its member franchises is in per se violation of the Sherman Act). For an
examination of the horizontal restraints present in Topco, see R. BORK, supra note 41, at 274-
78. Judge Bork believes that when a joint activity is essential to a project that produces eco-
nomic efficiency, it should be examined under the rule of reason.
50. 405 U.S. at 607-08. See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963).
51. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
52. Horizontal price fixing is the practice that the courts have most frequently sought to
deter through application of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
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does not always result in per se illegality. In this case, the Columbia Broad-
casting System (CBS) had purchased blanket licenses for the use of copy-
righted music from Broadcast Music, Inc. and other membership
organizations. The licenses gave CBS the right to broadcast any or all of the
music covered in the agreement.5 3 The network charged that these blanket
licenses constituted per se price fixing. The Supreme Court found that
although price fixing was involved, the agreements served to lower prices
and increase output.54 Based on this evidence of competitive efficiencies, the
Court held that the market restraints should be examined under a rule of
reason test,55 thus allowing the trial court more fully to explore the justifica-
tion for the restraints.56
The Broadcast Music decision would appear to relax the per se invalida-
tion standards. But, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society," the
Supreme Court again utilized a strict per se approach, narrowing the distinc-
tion between the two tests.5 s The Maricopa County Medical Society had set
a maximum allowable fee for services performed by any of its member physi-
cians. There was no claim that the quality of the service was enhanced by
the agreement or that any competitive efficiencies resulted. 9 The Court
Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 334-38 (doctors could not agree to set maximum prices); Catalano, Inc. v.
Targeted Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1980) (attempt by beer wholesalers to eliminate
extension of credit to retailers was horizontal price fixing, a per se violation); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (distributor that would not sell to
a retailer without an agreement as to a fixed maximum resale price engaged in per se violation
of the Sherman Act); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (restric-
tion of output by oil companies a per se violation); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 396-98 (1927) (a group of 23 corporations, which produced 82% of the sanitary
pottery bathroom fixtures in the United States, conspired to limit output and fix prices, a per se
violation of the Sherman Act).
53. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 12. The flat fees were unrelated to the type or amount of
music used, but the individual copyright owners were still able to negotiate direct sales with
any potential buyers. Id. at 11 n.22.
54. Id. at 20-21.
55. Id. at 9-12, 20-23. The Court found that granting blanket licenses to broadcasters was
not universally viewed as price fixing. It determined instead that the licenses were not naked
restraints of trade, but allowed an integration of sales, monitoring and enforcement, which
would be virtually impossible if left to individual owners. The agreement opened more mar-
kets for composers and resulted in lower prices to the networks. Id.
56. Note that the Broadcast Music Court was only required to decide the appropriate test
by which the Court below would examine the price fixing. It did not decide the case on the
merits. Id. at 23.
57. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
58. Though the Court found per se price fixing, the preliminary examination that brought
the per se result considered the same factors that would be examined in a rule of reason analy-
sis. See id.
59. The Court contrasted the facts with those in Broadcast Music, finding none of the
competitive efficiencies or market necessities evident in Broadcast Music. 457 U.S at 355.
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found that when there was no appearance of potential economic benefit, the
restraint would be facially invalid because of its anticompetitive potential."
Lacking any evidence of market benefits, the Medical Society's agreement
thus fell squarely within the per se mold of horizontal price fixing.61
In order to apply a rule of reason analysis, the procompetitive results must
be apparent in the market, regardless of the appearance of any other benefi-
cial impact on the parties. In National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,6 2 the member engineers had established a canon prohibiting
competitive bids. All members refused to negotiate any fees with a client
until the contractor selected a prospective engineer for the project.63 The
engineers claimed that the policy benefitted society because price competi-
tion would adversely affect the quality of engineering and threaten public
safety.' While acknowledging that ethical guidelines could serve to regulate
and to promote competition,6 5 the Court found no procompetitive "market"
effect in this situation. The Court held that the rule of reason "does not
support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unrea-
sonable."6 6 When the rule of reason analysis has been applied in a commer-
cial context, the inquiry has always been limited solely to consideration of
the impact upon competitive conditions in the market, and not to an exami-
nation of the reasonableness of the anticompetitive practice itself.6 7
B. Applying the Sherman Act in Noncommercial Settings
Despite the Court's gradual shaping of an antitrust enforcement policy,
until recently, accepted judicial doctrines had shielded self-regulatory orga-
nizations like the NCAA from judicial scrutiny. 6' The Court traditionally
60. Id.
61. Id. at 357.
62. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
63. Id. at 681-82. The engineers sought to preserve a tradition in the profession in which
engineers were picked by background and reputation, not price. Id. at 684. Though the NSPE
did not "enforce" the policy, the Court found that it was actively followed by the membership.
Id. at 684 n.6.
64. Id. at 684-85. The NSPE claimed that though competitive pressure might temporarily
lower engineering costs, poor engineering would inevitably lead to higher construction costs
and decreased construction efficiency. Id. at 685 n.7.
65. Id. at 696.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 690. Courts have not considered the reasonableness of price itself, or special
characteristics of an affected industry. The final decision has only considered market impact.
See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
68. See Note, supra note 6, at 663. There are two types of self-regulatory associations: (1)
those that exchange information between members without trying to regulate conduct, United
States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); and (2) those that enforce rules for
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held that the Sherman Act sought to prevent restraints on competition only
in business and commercial transactions.69 It determined that the statute
was aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives, and that
antitrust laws applied only to a very limited extent to nonprofit organiza-
tions and noncommercial activities.7" Courts had, therefore, overlooked the
anticompetitive practices of the NCAA7 1 and other self-regulatory organiza-
tions72 because they were "traditionally noncommercial" entities.73
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association,7 4 however, the Supreme
Court rejected the previously accepted notion of antitrust immunity and
made clear that anticompetitive practices outside the usual business context
were not immune from antitrust law.7 5 In Goldfarb, the Virginia State Bar
Association had set a minimum fee schedule for title searches that effectively
operated as a price floor, thereby fixing the price.76 The Court determined
that although the Bar was generally a noncommercial self-regulating organi-
zation, its activities had some business aspects that were governed by the
Sherman Act.77 The Court held that the minimum fee schedule constituted
illegal price fixing, but noted that the public service aspects of such organiza-
tions might allow a more lenient examination of practices that would always
be violations in a purely commercial context.78
conduct of activities, but that exist primarily for the purpose of promoting the economic wel-
fare of their memberships, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See
also Note, supra note 6, at 655 n.1.
69. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (strikers who interrupted busi-
ness by preventing shipment of hose during an attempt to unionize did not restrain trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Act).
70. Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. at 213 n.7.
71. See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (the Sherman Act did not
reach the actions of the NCAA in setting eligibility requirements that denied eligibility to a
hockey player who had previously received compensation for playing); College Athletic Place-
ment Serv. v. NCAA, 1975 Trade Cas. 60,117, at 65,267 (D.N.J.), afjfd mem., 506 F.2d 1050
(3d Cir. 1974) (the NCAA had no anticompetitive intent and did not violate the Sherman Act
in adopting a rule excluding students who used an athlete's placement service from intercolle-
giate competition).
72. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
73. See Note, supra note 6, at 664.
74. 421 U.S. 733 (1975).
75. See Note, supra note 6, at 655. The Goldfarb Court found that the classification of an
organization as noncommercial, or as a professional organization, standing alone, does not
prevent application of the Sherman Act. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787.
76. Plaintiffs were real estate purchasers who attempted to find a lawyer to do a title
search for a fee less than that suggested by the Bar, but who were unable to do so. The Court
found that the prospect of discipline by the Bar effectively enforced price fixing although there
was no enforcement policy. Id. at 773-75.
77. Id. at 788.
78. Id. at 788 n.17. See also Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 310
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A number of courts have since relied on Goldfarb to find that the NCAA's
self-regulating practices are not immune from antitrust scrutiny. 79 In Hen-
nessey v. NCAA, ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that the public service nature of the NCAA justified examining other-
wise per se illegal market restraints under a rule of reason test.81 Assistant
football and basketball coaches at the University of Alabama had challenged
an NCAA bylaw that limited the number of assistant coaches allowable at
member institutions. This rule constituted a horizontal restraint on the
availability of assistant coaches in college athletics. But the court, under a
rule of reason test, determined that the rule had no identifiable effect in a
commercial market and upheld it as a legitimate regulation aimed at pre-
serving intercollegiate amateur sports competition 2-a worthy public inter-
est goal sought by the NCAA.
The regulation in question in Hennessey, however, affected only the
NCAA's noncommercial, self-regulating realm. In contrast, the NCAA tel-
evision plan regulated a more directly commercial television market that
might traditionally have been expected to receive greater protection under
the Sherman Act. This television plan was scrutinized by the Supreme Court
in NCAA v. Board of Regents.
II. NCAA v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA:
THE SUPREME COURT INVALIDATES THE NCAA's
TELEVISION PLAN
For more than thirty years, the NCAA strictly regulated college football
television.8 3 It negotiated all television contracts and prevented individual
schools from televising games outside the contracts. The NCAA's pur-
ported intent was to protect live attendance at football games and to main-
tain a competitive balance among the major football-playing colleges.8 4 In
response to an effort by some of its larger members to negotiate an alternate
television contract, the NCAA threatened wide-ranging sanctions in all
(D.C.N.Y. 1977), where the court held that agreements by an amateur athletic association
restricting the activities of a team should not have an absolute exception to antitrust laws, but
should be judged by the rule of reason. Id.
79. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975); Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma v. NCAA, 561 P.2d
499 (Okla. 1977).
80. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1136.
81. Id. at 1151-52.
82. The Court balanced the positive and negative market factors and could not determine
any market impact. Id. at 1153.
83. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1283 (1982).
84. Id. at 1295-97.
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sports against defectors from the NCAA television contract."5 The Univer-
sities of Oklahoma and Georgia subsequently challenged the NCAA plan on
the grounds that it prevented competition by fixing the price and restricting
the number of games televised.86 They also charged that under the NCAA
plan, independent networks and local stations were effectively precluded
from televising college football."' The Universities of Oklahoma and Geor-
gia successfully sued in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma to enjoin the NCAA from administering its plan. 8
The district court's decision was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals,89 and Justice White stayed the injunction9° in anticipation of the
Court granting certiorari to review the NCAA's plan.
The Supreme Court's consideration of NCAA v. Board of Regents required
it to determine if price and output restrictions were evident in the NCAA
television plan, to choose the appropriate standard by which it would assess
any anticompetitive aspects of the plan,9" and to decide if it could consider
the NCAA's noneconomic goals as factors in an affirmative defense. The
ultimate inquiry was whether, in light of the proferred justifications, the
NCAA's television plan imposed "unreasonable" 92 price and output re-
straints that violated the Sherman Act.
85. Id. at 1285-87.
86. Id. at 1293-94.
87. Id. at 1294-95.
88. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp at 1276.
89. Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1147.
90. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 1 (1983).
91. The potential impact of Board of Regents was not limited to intercollegiate football.
If the per se rule applies to restrictions such as those at issue in (Board of Regents],
courts may be foreclosed from considering in future antitrust cases the noncommer-
cial interests of other educational associations whose challenged activities have com-
mercial aspects and consequences. . . . [Therefore] the rule of reason is the
appropriate analysis for determining the legality of such agreements.
Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 20, at 717-18.
Traditionally, either a per se or a rule of reason standard is applied. See Board of Regents,
546 F. Supp. at 1304-11, 1313-19; Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1152-60. However, for some
interesting suggestions of hybrid proposals, see R. BORK, supra note 41 at 278-79; Note, supra
note 6, at 673-78.
92. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 51-62. In Standard Oil, Chief
Justice White discussed the common law principle (based in contract law) that contracts which
restrained trade should be invalidated because they were injurious to the public and to the
individuals who made them. Id. at 50-51. But, he found, under the common law, if the re-
straint was only partial, and the contract was otherwise reasonable, it was held to be valid. Id.
at 51. He believed that Congress intended that this rationale be carried forward to the applica-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 50-51. See also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying
text.
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A. Protection v. Competition
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court, after examining the
NCAA's television plan in a detailed rule of reason analysis, determined that
the plan unreasonably restricted trade. Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
jority, invalidated the NCAA television contracts and enjoined the NCAA
from promulgating further anticompetitive regulations.9 3
The majority found that the NCAA's television practices amounted to
horizontal restraints on competition.94 By placing a ceiling on the number
of games televised and limiting broadcast availability, the NCAA had estab-
lished an artificial limit on output and had unreasonably restricted trade.9"
By setting a minimum aggregate price, the NCAA had effectively eliminated
any broadcaster-institution negotiation, thereby engaging in price fixing-in
the eyes of the Court, the most unreasonable restraint of trade possible.96
The Court's initial focus was on the appropriate depth of the inquiry.
Based on prior case law, the district court and the Tenth Circuit had a valid
basis for finding a per se violation of the Sherman Act.97 Yet, the Supreme
93. But see Board of Regents v. NCAA, No. 81-1209, slip op. at 6-8 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31,
1984) (relaxing the injunction against the NCAA). The district court later clarified its holding,
stating that the NCAA could coordinate television contracts for its member schools, but only
under a contract that was much less restrictive than the invalidated plan. Id. at 7-8. See infra
note 159.
94. See supra note 31.
95. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2959-60. See also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. at 608-09; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (an agreement by territorial
"licensees," who owned all the stock in the parent bedding corporation, and controlled its
operations, strictly to restrict sales to assigned territories, represented horizontal restraints in
violation of the Sherman Act).
96. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960. See supra note 52.
97. The per se rule is applied when a practice appears to be one that would almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20. In
Board of Regents, both the district court and the Tenth Circuit relied on the traditional per se
standards. They concluded that violations alleged in Board of Regents were analogous to those
in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal restraints), Socony-Vac-
uum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing), and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332 (1982) (price fixing); and, therefore, were per se antitrust violations that lacked any
redeeming value, regardless of the machinery used to implement the restraints. See Board of
Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1304; Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223. Both the lower courts under-
took some discussion of the rule of reason analysis. They rejected its applicability, however,
deciding that the NCAA television plan was "so fraught with anticompetitive potential" that it
would nearly always tend to restrict competition, thereby qualifying the restraints as per se
violations under Broadcast Music. Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1153. See also Board of
Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1304. The district court and the Tenth Circuit recognized the fine
line between the rule of reason and per se standards. But, based on the strong precedent
favoring a per se antitrust application for restrictions on price and output, both held that the
NCAA's television plan resulted in per se violations. See Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1153-
54; see also Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1313-19.
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Court unanimously agreed that the case merited analysis under the rule of
reason. 98 The rule of reason should be applied, Justice Stevens wrote, not
because of inexperience with the subject, 99 nor because the NCAA is a non-
profit entityl o with an important role in preserving amateur athletics."° '
Instead, the Court applied the more flexible rule of reason inquiry because of
the unique nature of college football as an industry in which some form of
horizontal restraint is essential."12 Justice Stevens determined that the
unique tradition, character and integrity of college football1 13 could only be
preserved by mutual agreement." He emphasized that college football is a
consumer product in great demand, and therefore termed the NCAA's role
98. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960-62. Justice White, in dissent (joined by Justice
Rehnquist) agreed that the rule of reason was the appropriate antitrust analysis. 104 S. Ct. at
2978. The Court attempted to downplay any change in philosophy that might be evidenced by
its choice of rule of reason analysis. Justice Stevens stressed that there was no bright line
separating per se from the rule of reason. Id. at 2962 n.26. He noted that the rule of reason
did not require an elaborate and precise measurement of harm, but could be applied in the
"twinkling of an eye." Id. at 2965 n.39 (quoting P. AREEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 37-38 (Federal Judicial Center, June 1981)). See
also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, at 8, NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2948. Regardless of the depth of the analysis, Justice Stevens
stated, "the essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint en-
hances competition." Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2962. The Court intimated that the per
se and rule of reason terminology had become overly polarized, and it attempted to display
that there was room for a middle ground analysis. The amicus brief filed by the United States
made this argument. Although the Court rejected the "truncated" rule of reason test ad-
vanced in the United States' brief, some of its reasoning appears in the Court's discussion of
the similarity of the two analyses. See Amicus Brief at 6-9. See also Greene, supra note 8, at
20, col. 4. The Court proceeded with a rule of reason analysis primarily because the television
plan's relation to the NCAA's legitimate regulations increased the possibility that the imposed
restraints were reasonable. 104 S. Ct. at 2960. See Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897,
901 (9th Cir. 1983).
99. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960 n.21. Inexperience can be a factor in applying a
rule of reason approach. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9-10; Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at
607-08. But generally, price and output restrictions necessitate a per se application without
further inquiry. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 349-51; National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689-90.
100. Section 1 of the Sherman Act was applied to nonprofit entities in Goldfarb, 421 U.S.
773, 786-87 (1975). The NCAA did not, however, rely on its nonprofit character for reversal.
Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960 n.22.
101. Justice Stevens noted, however, that given its traditional role, the NCAA's motive was
accorded a presumption of reasonability. Id. at 2960 n.23.
102. Id. at 2960-61.
103. Id. at 2961. The Court commented that the academic tradition of the college football
"product" differentiated it from other comparable sports (like minor league baseball) and
made it more popular than those sports. Id.
104. Id. See R. BORK, supra note 41, at 278-79. Judge Bork maintains that when an inte-
gration is essential for the activity, efficient restraints should be lawful. But, if not essential,
restraints should be strictly limited, and should be lawful only under certain narrow condi-
tions. Id. See also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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as generally procompetitive in the realm of "on field" intercollegiate athletic
activities.' °5 Because the NCAA claimed that the television plan was an
integral part of its regulatory scheme aimed at preserving amateur athletic
competition, the Court held that application of the rule of reason was appro-
priate to determine whether any procompetitive efficiencies justified the
NCAA's market restraints.
10 6
The Court examined the workings of the NCAA television plan in detail,
relying heavily on the district court's factual findings.107 The Court found
105. 104 S. Ct. at 2961. The Supreme Court's factual finding that the NCAA plan consti-
tuted price fixing and output restraints would have invalidated per se any agreement that had
taken place in a normal business setting. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. at 50 n.16; Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Nevertheless, the rule of reason does
allow consideration of the procompetitive effects of, and the justifications for, the restraint.
See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, at 716. But, in Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1
(1979), the Court examined only the reasonability of procompetitive results-in the market-
where price fixing had increased market output without substantially affecting competition or
market price, thereby rendering an acceptable market efficiency. In Broadcast Music, the asso-
ciation involved sold the compositions of composers in the group for a fixed price, but the
individual composers were still free to contract on their own outside the blanket licensing
agreement. The jointly marketed product offered new market outlets and did not significantly
affect the market for individual sales. The Broadcast Music Court found this to be reasonable
restraint on trade. See Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1156. This conforms with the Supreme
Court's holding in National Society of Professional Engineers that the rule of reason "does not
open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may
fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact
on competitive conditions." Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
106. Despite the lack of evidence that the NCAA plan would produce positive market
impact, the Court embarked on a detailed rule of reason analysis of the plan. Board of Re-
gents, 104 S. Ct. at 2959-62. As a result, the reasonableness of the NCAA's market restraints
was assessed not on the basis of any purely economic impact, but in the context of the NCAA's
ancillary noncommercial goals: the maintenance of academic standards and assurance of a
competitive balance in Division IA football. Neither of these considerations resembles an eco-
nomic impact-the only consideration that could justify a rule of reason analysis. See Board of
Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960-71.
Had the Court not adapted its rule of reason threshold, however, the fear of some commen-
tators, that "a critical issue-whether the traditional goals and character of college football
can survive without some restraints on television broadcast activities-may entirely elude judi-
cial consideration," would have been realized. Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 20, at
722. Although the NCAA television plan clearly presented negative market consequences, the
Court set a lower threshold for access to the rule of reason test so that it might examine the
restraints in light of the NCAA's entire regulatory structure. Thus, the Court demonstrated a
willingness to lower the rule of reason threshold for all anticompetitive practices that do not
take place in a purely commercial context. The decision thus steers a course for noncommer-
cial antitrust analyses that the Court appeared to be charting in Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n. 17,
a course that some lower courts have already adopted. See Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977); Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio 1980); see infra note 162.
107. 104 S. Ct. at 2955-57. In previous cases, when the Court had inquired beyond the per
se ban on price fixing and horizontal restraints, it had done so in recognition of an identifiable
[Vol. 34:857
NCAA v. Board of Regents
that the plan increased price and reduced output,108 and that many more
college football games would be televised in the absence of these controls.
The plan was therefore deemed to be unresponsive to consumer demand. 109
Moreover, the Court found that the plan eliminated broadcasters from the
market, because only broadcasters large enough to bid on the NCAA's en-
tire package could compete.' ° The NCAA had contended that the plan
could not have an anticompetitive effect because the NCAA had no market
power.' The Court responded that the NCAA did indeed have market
possibility of procompetitive impact that might be realized in the specified market. See, e.g.,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (economic efficiency used as a
rationale for allowing what had been a per se violation through vertical location restriction).
However, it is clear throughout the Board of Regents case that the Supreme Court agreed with
the district court's factual findings that the NCAA's plan provided no purely economic market
benefits. See Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2962-71. The district court found that the NCAA
controls destroyed free market competition, fixed prices, and grossly distorted actual prices
paid. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1318.
108. The NCAA had operated like a business, seeking to maximize revenues and minimize
expenses for the purpose of maintaining a product that would be attractive to the public.
Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1288-89. By restricting dealings to a single network, it was
clear that the NCAA fixed the price to be paid for each game telecast and made it impossible
for schools to negotiate a higher price. Id. at 1293. The NCAA's plan strictly controlled the
networks' contacts with individual schools. The plan required payment of a minimum fee for
the entire year's television package, and allowed the NCAA to "recommend" minimum and
maximum payments by the networks for each game shown. These "recommendations" were
followed without exception-effectively fixing the price. Id. at 1288-89. The minimum fee
eliminated any incentive "to reward games of greater merit with higher payments" because
games between mediocre teams would result in the same per game payment as games between
the best teams in the country. Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1152 n.5. See, e.g., infra note
109. Any indication of competitive negotiation with the individual schools was purely illusory
and free market competition was in fact destroyed by the NCAA's plan. Board of Regents, 546
F. Supp. at 1291-93.
109. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2963-64. To demonstrate the unresponsive nature of
the contract, in 1981, ABC carried simultaneously the Oklahoma-University of Southern Cali-
fornia game on 200 stations and the Citadel-Appalachian State game on four stations. All four
schools received the same payment for television rights. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at
1291.
110. The Court compared the exclusion of small broadcasters from the market to the anti-
trust violations found in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154 (1948)
(block booking in the motion picture industry violated the Sherman Act). See also Amicus
Brief at 24, Board of Regents.
111. Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1154-55. The NCAA contended that it merely re-
strained intrabrand competition (competition for television money and appearances between
the football playing members of the NCAA) in an effort to stimulate interbrand competition
(competition between televised college football and other programming available in the
broader "entertainment" market which the NCAA contended that it competed in). Id. at
1155. Restricting intrabrand competition in order to enhance interbrand competition is poten-
tially procompetitive. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977).
The NCAA's plan and revenue pooling arrangements allow the NCAA to offer monopoly
rights for sports broadcasts that are ideal for commercial messages and, therefore, very valua-
ble to the competing networks. The NCAA's assertion that the prime motive of these restric-
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
power, 1 12 but that even if it did not, such naked restraints on competition
demanded some procompetitive justification.' 13
Justice Stevens concluded that the NCAA television plan plainly consti-
tuted restraints on price and output in a market completely controlled by the
NCAA.1 14 These market restraints violated the Sherman Act, and the rule
of reason placed a "heavy burden" on the NCAA to provide an affirmative
defense justifying its market distortion.'1 5 The NCAA attempted to meet
tions is protection of the live gate and promotion of college football is arguable at best.
Hochberg & Horowitz, Broadcasting and CA TV: The Beauty and the Bane of Major College
Football, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 1973, at 118-20.
112. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2965-66. College football is uniquely attractive and
draws premium advertising prices. The Court found that it had no reasonable substitute, and,
therefore, the NCAA had market power. Id. See also International Boxing Club v. United
States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (championship boxing uniquely attractive to fans). Market power
is the ability to raise prices above those-that would be charged in a competitive market. United
States Steel v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977). See also United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (when no substitute product is available, there is
market power or monopoly power). "Market power is generally measured indirectly through
defining relevant product and geographic markets, and then measuring a particular enter-
prises's [sic] share of the market as defined. The higher the market share, the more likely the
enterprise possesses monopoly power." Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League
as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare
Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34 n.156 (1983).
The unique dimension that college football brings to television programming is reflected by
the willingness of CBS and ABC to pay twice the amount for the nonexclusive rights for 1983-
85 as ABC had paid for exclusive rights from 1978-81. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1300.
The district court noted that the NCAA was free from its natural market competition because
the NFL's antitrust immunity agreement precluded competitive telecasts. Id. at 1297. The
cost per viewer for college football advertising is more than two and one half times greater
than the cost for other programming. Id. See also Hochberg & Horowitz, supra note 111, at
119.
113. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2965-66. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. at 221. Justice Stevens observed that proving monopoly power in a market was
not essential in demonstrating that a restraint was unreasonable. "[N]o matter how broadly or
narrowly the market is defined-the NCAA television restrictions have reduced output, sub-
verted viewer choice and distorted pricing. Consequently ... the controls . ..should be
deemed unlawful regardless of whether petitioner has substantial market power over advertis-
ing dollars." Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2965 n.42 (quoting the Solicitor General, Amicus
Brief at 19-20, Board of Regents).
114. The Supreme Court found "live college television football" to be a separate and dis-
tinct market because there was no other programming that could reasonably be substituted for
televised college football. 104 S. Ct. at 2968. This was convincingly illustrated by CBS's deci-
sion to "go dark" (leave the broadcast time to local affiliates), and refrain from running pro-
gramming opposite NCAA football during periods from 1978-81 when ABC had exclusive
telecast rights. Board of Regents, 707 F.2d at 1158.
115. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2967. Once the plaintiff has demonstrated that market
restraints exist, the rule of reason requires the defendant convincingly to demonstrate that the
restraints have a procompetitive effect in the market that justifies their retention. See Profes-
sional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692-96.
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the heavy burden of providing an affirmative defense by claiming that the
NCAA plan was a joint venture similar to the procompetitive licensing
agreement approved by the Supreme Court in Broadcast Music." 6 The
Court distinguished between the agreements, however, finding that the
NCAA plan had no comparable procompetitive efficiencies that could be
expected to increase output and to reduce the price paid for televising
games. 1
7
In addition, Justice Stevens examined the NCAA's claim that live games
could not compete with televised contests and that the plan protected live
attendance by limiting the number of broadcasts." 8 Justice Stevens noted
that, under the plan, Saturdays were packed with as many as nine hours of
live college football telecasts, 1 9 and refused to accept the protection argu-
ment. Stevens further found that the rule of reason would not support a
defense based on the assumption that the product is insufficient to attract
customers and, therefore, requires the protection of anticompetitive re-
116. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23-24. In Broadcast Music, the licensing agreement
offered an efficient method of group marketing for musical compositions. Most of the compos-
ers would have been unable to market their music at all without a joint selling arrangement,
and the purpose of the agreement was primarily to make compositions available in the market,
not to set market prices or reduce output. The individual composers were all free to sell
outside the agreement, and did so. Id.
117. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2967-68. Compare Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23
(procompetitive joint venture with no individual marketing restrictions) with Board of Regents,
546 F. Supp. at 1307-08 (price fixing and market restraints, with sanctions against members
who violate the agreement). In Board of Regents, the majority found that, unlike Broadcast
Music, under the NCAA's television plan: (1) an agreement on price was not necessary for the
marketing of the product; (2) the NCAA was not a joint selling agent, and individual schools
negotiated the actual sale; (3) the individual schools were not able to sell their product outside
the agreement without restraint; and (4) there was no interbrand competition necessitating the
market efficiencies of a joint venture. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2962-71. Indeed, the
Court could not identify any competitive efficiencies to justify a joint venture. Competitive
efficiencies should result in a lower cost per game and more telecasts, but the Court found
exactly the opposite under the NCAA television plan. Id. at 2967-68.
118. Id. at 2968-69. The NCAA claimed that televising games at the same time as live
games that are not televised, would reduce the attendance at the competing live games. The
claim was not only that televising a game would hurt attendance at the game being televised,
but that it had a negative effect on all games played in any broadcast area. Thus, the NCAA
argued, regulation of the number of telecasts was essential. Id. The NCAA based this defense
primarily on a series of 25 year old reports showing that televised games had a detrimental
effect on live attendance. The district court found that these reports were no longer persuasive
in today's market because the fluid preferences in the entertainment market, the lack of con-
trols present in the study, and the growth of college football rendered the report's results
suspect. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1295-96.
119. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2969 n.59. The Court found that the contract for the
1984 season would have allowed head-to-head television competition with live gates for virtu-
ally all Saturday games nationwide-"hardly a plan ... devised in order to protect gate at-
tendance." Id. (quoting Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1296).
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straints-in effect an argument that competition itself is unreasonable.' 2 °
Finally, the NCAA contended that its regulations, including the television
plan, were important to the maintenance of a competitive balance in college
football.' 2 ' The majority found no evidence, however, that the television
plan equalized, or was intended to equalize competition.' 22 Justice Stevens
stated that the television plan had no identifiable positive impact on competi-
tive balance among the schools, and that in any case the NCAA had other
noncommercial regulations that were better tailored toward preserving a
competitive balance.' 23 He stressed that the NCAA imposed no such re-
straints on other intercollegiate sports, and cited college basketball as a sport
in which the NCAA had maintained a competitive balance without a restric-
tive television plan.' 24
If the plan's goal was to increase intercollegiate football competition, it
had proven to be far too broad for that purpose and actually served to re-
120. Id. at 2969. "[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assump-
tion that competition itself is unreasonable." Id. (quoting Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
696).
121. Id. It is important to note that the Tenth Circuit defined competitive balance as a
noneconomic justification that "cannot be used to justify restraints on competition." Board of
Regents, 707 F.2d at 1154. See also Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-96. The Court consid-
ered other noneconomic goals ancillary to the NCAA's regulatory scheme, but the NCAA's
program-wide effort to preserve a "competitive athletic balance" was the affirmative defense
that the NCAA relied on most. 104 S. Ct. at 2969. Competitive balance was also the argu-
ment most prevalent in Justice White's dissent. Although the Court was receptive for the first
time to undertaking a rule of reason analysis based primarily on noneconomic justifications for
market distortions, the NCAA failed to identify competitive efficiencies that either created
economic efficiencies in a commercial market or that enhanced athletic competition between
its member schools, and was unable to justify its restraints.
122. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2969-70. The Court relied on the district court's find-
ing that if its goal was to limit the football power elite and encourage a better competitive
balance, the plan was a miserable failure. There was a strong "power elite" in college football
that was perpetuated in part by the elite's dominance of the limited television exposure pro-
vided for in the plan. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1310-11.
123. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2970. The NCAA has a far reaching regulatory
scheme. It regulates the number of games played per season, and the number of players and
coaches per team, establishes all game rules, intensively regulates high school recruitment, sets
standards of academic achievement and limits the number of scholarships allowed each school.
Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1309-10. In fact, the increased competitive balance in col-
lege football in the 1983 and 1984 football seasons has been attributed almost solely to a rule
adopted in 1975 that limits the total number of football scholarships at any one time at any
school to 95. Wilbon, All Cards Are Wild in a College Football Season of Parity, Politics,
Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1984, at El, cols. 3-4. After nine years, the effects are becoming evi-
dent-traditional powers can no longer hoard most of the talent.
124. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2970. In college basketball, the schools or conferences
arrange their own television contracts, with local games frequently televised on local stations,
and with the networks televising national games on most weekends. See Board of Regents, 546
F. Supp. at 1284-85.
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strict rather than to enhance competition. The Court held that the NCAA
not only had failed to identify a procompetitive impact, as required by the
rule of reason, but it had also been unable to demonstrate how competitive
balance would falter without its television plan.125
The Supreme Court concluded that although most of the NCAA's regula-
tions were procompetitive and increased public interest in athletics, the
NCAA's television plan served no legitimate purpose and contributed noth-
ing to the success of college football. 126 The Court maintained that without
the NCAA's television restrictions smaller schools might flourish in local
markets, enhancing their ability to compete nationally, and thereby increas-
ing the overall consumer interest in college football.' 27
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White disagreed with the majority's find-
ings of fact.' 28 He remained unconvinced that the NCAA's television plan
had resulted in any increased prices or price fixing.' 29 Justice White main-
tained that there was no evidence to show that the NCAA had the ability to
extract higher prices from the networks than would be paid in a competitive
situation. ' 30
Justice White took issue with the finding that the television plan restricted
output. He suggested that output should be measured by total viewership
rather than by the number of games televised.' 3' Justice White maintained
that by increasing total viewership the NCAA had a procompetitive effect
125. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2969-70. The NCAA could give no factually sup-
ported argument explaining why competitive balance would fail without the NCAA as the
exclusive agent for college football television. Id. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
126. The Court stated that the NCAA's role should be to preserve a tradition that might
otherwise die. But the Court found that the television plan "restricted rather than enhanced"
the role of college football as an important national interest. Id. at 2971.
127. The Court implied that increased, television exposure would result in more opportuni-
ties for more prospective college athletes by making more schools competitive-thereby in-
creasing the demand for student athletes. Id. at 2970 n.68.
128. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2974-79. Judge Barrett, in his Tenth Circuit dissent,
raised many of the same objections as Justice White. Yet he concluded that the NCAA plan
would constitute per se price fixing if not for analysis under the rule of reason. Board of
Regents, 707 F.2d at 1167.
129. Justice White asserted that exclusive television rights were a valuable new product
that brought higher prices than what an individual NCAA member could obtain in the open
market for nonexclusive rights. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2975-76.
130. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2976. Justice White argued that as long as the NCAA
did not artifically increase the price of the whole package above what market prices would be,
but only restricted price in redistributing television income, the plan was justified. Id.
131. Id. at 2975. Viewership is not, however, the appropriate indicator of procompetitive
effects on output in this market. It might be an appropriate measure of procompetitive effects
in the wider "entertainment" market, but the number of games telecast better reflects output in
the "college football television market" that the Court found the NCAA television plan to be
operating in. See id. at 2966-67.
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because it maintained college football's popularity and kept it competitive
with other forms of entertainment.
Moreover, Justice White protested that the NCAA should properly be
considered to be within the broader entertainment market rather than within
the narrow "live college football television market." '132 He claimed that col-
lege football was successful because of the NCAA's management and the
cooperation of the NCAA's members in marketing their product. But, he
admonished, if the product were to "deteriorate to any perceptible degree,"
its fans would turn to other forms of entertainment. 133 Justice White thus
focused on the success of college football within the larger television en-
tertainment market.
Justice White did not make any relevant assertions directly in support of
the NCAA's joint venture defense, but he did dispute some of the factual
findings used by the majority to distinguish the NCAA television plan from
acceptable joint ventures similar to the joint venture at issue in Broadcast
Music. The dissent concluded that the restraints in the plan were not likely
to suppress or to destroy competition, but instead would merely regulate and
thereby promote competition.1 34 Protection of the live gate was asserted to
be a valid NCAA goal. Justice White urged that maintaining live attend-
ance was essential to the continued success of college football, and that the
NCAA's plan was ancillary to its primary role of preserving amateur inter-
collegiate sports.' 3
5
Further, Justice White indicated that the plan promoted competition be-
tween colleges. Justice White claimed that the plan assured that a diversity
of games would be televised, and that revenues would be distributed on an
equitable basis, providing some measure of television revenue to all
schools. 136 He added that the regulations prevented unlimited television ap-
pearances by traditional football powers that would give them an insupera-
ble competitive advantage. 37 Justice White concluded that the television
132. Id. at 2976-77. In his dissent in National Football League v. North American Soccer
League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), Justice
Rehnquist found NFL football to be part of the broader "entertainment" market because it
was a joint venture whose entertainment product happened to be football. See Grauer, supra
note 112, at 34 n.156.
133. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2976-77 (quoting Grauer, supra note 112, at 34 n.156).
134. Id. at 2977 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
Whether the restriction merely regulates and thereby promotes competition was the standard
established in Chicago Board of Trade. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 2977-78.
136. Id. at 2976-77. Under the plan, "less prominent schools receive more in rights fees
than they would receive in a competitive market and football powers like [Georgia and
Oklahoma] receive less." Id. at 2975 (citing Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1315).
137. Id. In 1983, 173 schools appeared on television. Id. at 2973. Justice White asserted
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plan's procompetitive effect on intercollegiate competition nationwide offset
any minimal anticompetitive effects found by the majority.1 38
B. The Court's Reasonable Result: Invalidation of an Overly Restrictive
Plan
Justice White's dissent was based on the argument that associations of
nonprofit institutions must not be forced to defend their market restraints
solely on economic terms. He stressed that the courts must consider the
noneconomic values these institutions promote.' 39 Justice White asserted
that the majority looked upon the NCAA's involvement in college football
television as a purely commercial venture." ° Had the Court factored
noneconomic considerations into its analysis, he felt it would have found the
NCAA's television plan to be eminently reasonable and consistent with the
NCAA's legitimate goals of preserving and promoting intercollegiate ama-
teur athletics.'
4 1
Contrary to Justice White's dissent, however, the majority did factor the
NCAA's noneconomic goals into its analysis. 42 As a fundamentally non-
commercial entity involved in unique regulation outside the usual business
setting, the NCAA's motives were given a respectful presumption of valid-
ity.' 43 The NCAA's unique relation to an important American tradition
was doubtless a factor in convincing the Court to analyze the restraints
under a rule of reason test, 44 despite the lack of any evidence to suggest any
justifying procompetitive market efficiencies.145 The Court thus adapted its
standard rule of reason analysis to the NCAA's noneconomic arguments.
The Court considered it evident from the facts that the NCAA plan con-
stituted an illegal market restraint, and developments since this decision
that without the television plan, this number would drop dramatically, negatively affecting the
competitive balance in college football. See id. at 2974-76.
138. Id. at 2979.
139. Id. at 2978.
140. Id. at 2978. Justice White felt that the majority erred in treating college athletic pro-
grams as entities that were primarily interested in the pursuit of profits. Id.
141. Justice White suggested that the plan reduced the financial incentives of professional-
ism by regulating the number of television appearances per school and by pooling television
revenues. Id.
142. Id. at 2969-71. The Court analyzed the importance of college football's competitive
balance, its noneconomic goals, and its critical role in amateur college sports (all noncommer-
cial considerations) in great detail. Id.
143. Id. at 2960 n.23.
144. Id. at 2960.
145. Procompetitive market impact was required in Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1 (1979),
and in Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See also supra notes 105-07 and accompany-
ing text.
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demonstrate that the majority was correct in finding that the plan grossly
distorted prices and output. Network costs for televising games in the Fall
of 1984 dropped dramatically from what they would have been under the
NCAA plan, 146 and many more games are being televised, especially in pre-
viously untapped regional markets. 147
Justice White, in dissent, focused on the plan's role in preserving college
football's status in the entertainment market. Although Justice White was
surely correct in noting that college football's "non-existent competitors" 14
8
would quickly return if the present market were to deteriorate, consideration
of college football within the "entertainment" market, as suggested by Jus-
tice White, would not have provided an accurate picture of the market forces
at work during the period in which the plan was being implemented-the
relevant focus of the inquiry. Because there was no competition for televised
college football at the time of the suit, the majority's narrow focus was en-
tirely appropriate.
In Broadcast Music, the Court intimated that certain procompetitive joint
ventures could pass muster under a rule of reason test. The NCAA likened
its plan to the Broadcast Music agreement, but the Court identified clear
anticompetitive differences between the Broadcast Music agreement and the
NCAA plan. 149 On the basis of the Supreme Court's factual findings, the
NCAA's plan would fail all the joint venture tests applied in Broadcast Mu-
sic. 5° The NCAA's restraints did not increase market efficiency and were
broader than necessary to achieve their asserted goals. Furthermore, one of
the plan's fundamental purposes was to restrict output. The majority was
146. Under the terms of the invalidated NCAA contract, CBS and NBC would have paid
$68.5 million in rights for the 1984 season. Asher, Court Decision to Cost ACC $3 Million in
TV Rights, Wash. Post, July 18, 1984, at C1, col. 3. The post-decision price for all the new
national contracts combined, however, did not exceed $35 million. Martzke, CBS Looks to
ACC to Fill Football Lineup, USA Today, Jan. 9, 1985, at 3C, col. 7. "So far, we're seeing a
rather depressed marketplace. . . . [iut's obvious per-game rights fees will not be the same as
under the previous NCAA plan by any stretch of the imagination." Asher, supra at C1, cols.
2-3 (quoting John Swofford, Chairman, NCAA Television Committee).
147. For example, last fall in Boston "[a]t noon, when most schools and conferences agreed
to air their regional packages, [you had] your pick of the Ivy League on PBS, a Boston College,
Pitt or Syracuse game on another channel and Notre Dame or Penn State on yet a third."
Taafe, A Supremely Unsettling Smorgasbord, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 15, 1984, at 150.
148. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2976.
149. Id. at 2961-62. See supra notes 105, 117.
150. Judge Bork outlined a sound test for assessing the viability of a joint venture under the
Sherman Act that clarifies the approach taken by the Broadcast Music Court. This proposal
would allow restrictive agreements that: (1) increased market efficiencies and were no broader
than necessary; (2) had a collective market share that did not present a danger of output
restriction; and (3) did not have the primary purpose of restricting output. When any of these
conditions were not met, an agreement would be unlawful. R. BORK, supra note 41, at 279.
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therefore correct in holding that the NCAA's plan should not benefit from
the teachings of Broadcast Music.
The Court also examined the NCAA's attendance and competitive bal-
ance defenses, conscious of the fact that they were not market impact or
competitive efficiency defenses, and considered the plan in light of the
NCAA's overall role in college football. Protection of the live gate was not
effective as an affirmative defense because a demonstration that output has
been limited to protect sales is not viewed as procompetitive. 5 The com-
petitive balance defense was also ineffective because the NCAA had potent
alternative regulations that could assure continued competitive balance with-
out regulation of television broadcasts. 52
Having rejected the NCAA's affirmative defenses and having determined
that the NCAA indeed operated in the relevant market as a business primar-
ily interested in maximizing profits,153 the Court, upon finding that the tele-
vision plan did not serve even to further the NCAA's noncommercial goals,
was compelled to condemn the NCAA's anticompetitive practices. The
NCAA had strayed from the purpose for which it was organized, 54 and had
entered into commercial activities prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Although the organization's traditionally noncommercial role in fostering
competition in intercollegiate athletics was duly considered by the Court,
this position could not shield it from antitrust scrutiny when it imposed im-
proper market restraints in a commercial context. Although the majority
deemphasized its analysis of the NCAA's noneconomic justifications, 55 the
Court essentially utilized the test Justice White had suggested. The only real
difference was the final result. The majority found no justification for the
NCAA's distortion of the college football television market, even under a
flexible rule of reason test that considered not only competitive efficiencies,
but noneconomic factors as well.
Justice White highlighted the fact that the Court specifically failed to hold
that the NCAA may not: (1) require its members to pool and to share reve-
nues from televised games; (2) limit the number of times that an NCAA
member may appear on telecasts in a given time frame; or (3) "enforce rea-
sonable blackout arrangements to avoid head-to-head competition for televi-
sion audiences."15 6 Indeed, the CFA and a number of other organizations
151. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960. See supra note 120.
152. See supra note 123.
153. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960 n.22. Justice Stevens concluded that the NCAA
was as likely to reduce output to increase price as any for-profit entity. Id. See supra note 108.
154. See Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1328.
155. See supra note 98.
156. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2974. Justice White emphasized that the Court held
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quickly sprang forward to fill the NCAA vacuum and negotiate network
television contracts for the 1984 season. 1
5 7
In response to decreased revenues realized during the 1984 season, these
organizations have been contemplating a new joint effort to restrict the
number of football broadcasts. 1 8 But any such organizations, including the
NCAA, are on notice that their television agreements must be drawn nar-
rowly enough to avoid market restraints that would violate the Sherman Act
under a rule of reason test. 59 Given the Supreme Court's apparent intoler-
ance of restraints that are aimed purely at maximization of profits, any new
agreement must plainly demonstrate a procompetitive effect on college foot-
ball that assists the NCAA in promoting its traditional noneconomic values.
only that the NCAA could not limit the number of games broadcast or set an overall contract
price that has the effect of fixing the prices for individual games. Id. See infra note 159.
157. In 1984, the CFA contracted with ABC. The Big Ten and Pacific 10 conferences had
a joint package with CBS. The Southeastern Conference and some independent colleges signed
with the Turner Broadcasting System. Most other major conferences had regionally syndi-
cated television packages. See Asher, Behind the Scenes It's A Whole New Game, Seattle
Times, Aug. 26, 1984, at B12, col. 1. For the 1985 season, the CFA again signed with ABC.
Asher, CFA Approves 2-Year Renewal of TV Plan, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1985, at D5, col. 5.
The Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Army and Navy, however, have contracted with CBS
for the 1985-86 seasons (although they remain members of the CFA). Asher, NCAA to Delay
Starting Any Drug Testing Program, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1985, at D2, col. 5. The ACC aban-
doned the CFA plan because only one of its games had been televised by ABC in 1984, while
the new CBS contract guarantees at least 14 exposures (the total number of teams to appear) in
1985-86. Id. The plan will also pay the ACC $3.5 million, substantially more than it expected
to receive under the CFA plan (the ACC received $1.1 million in 1984). Id.; Asher, ACC
Mulls Network Switch, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1985, at E2, col. 3. CBS also contracted with the
Pacific 10 (PAC 10) and Big 10 conferences for 1985-86. Asher, NCAA to Delay Starting Any
Drug Testing, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1985, at D2, col. 5. CBS will pay the PAC 10/Big 10 a
total of $18.5 million for 28-30 games over the two season term. Asher, CBSAnnounces Deals;
Rights Are NCAA Topic, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1985, at D3, col. 5. Although the contracts run
for only two years, they are a good indication of how the college football television market will
operate in the future. This type of flexibility in responding to changing market situations is
what the Court sought in its invalidation of the NCAA's strict controls.
158. As a result of television receipts being halved in 1984, efforts were undertaken to form
a new single administrative body to regulate broadcasts. Martzke, Colleges May Unite to Boost
TV Revenue, USA Today, Oct. 25, 1984, at Cl, cols. 4-5. Most of the proposals, however,
were very similar to the old NCAA plan, and would not stand up under the Supreme Court's
holding in Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). "Anything that was attractive economi-
cally created legal problems." Asher, TV Football has NCAA Confused, Wash. Post, Jan. 13,
1985, at M8, col. 1 (quoting Tom Hansen, Executive Director of the PAC 10).
159. In an opinion relaxing the injunction against the NCAA, Judge Burciaga held that a
single entity, including the NCAA, could regulate college football television, as long as it
stayed strictly within the guidelines of Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2948, and did not mo-
nopolize all college football broadcasts. Board of Regents, No. 81-1209, slip op. at 6-8 (W.D.
Okla., Oct. 31, 1984). See supra note 93. But given the apparent goals of the schools in regu-
lating broadcasts-to increase revenues and protect attendance, see Martzke, supra note 146,
the NCAA members will have to draw any plan carefully to avoid invalidation by the courts.
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It is possible that only a plan demonstrating direct procompetitive market
efficiencies in the "college football television market" will be acceptable to
the Court.
C. Future Implications for College Football and for Antitrust Law
The Supreme Court's rationale for examining the NCAA television plan
under the rule of reason test in NCAA v. Board of Regents is the aspect of the
Court's decision that will have the strongest impact on similar cases arising
in the future. In applying a rule of reason analysis, the Court displayed a
willingness to consider the reasonability of market restraint mechanisms in
light of noneconomic considerations that had previously been excluded from
antitrust analyses.' 6° Board of Regents thus represents a more flexible rule
of reason approach for restraints in a noncommercial setting than the "mar-
ket impact," result oriented rule of reason standard previously used in a
traditional business context.
In Goldfarb, the Court had hinted that it might apply a modified rule of
reason test to noncommercial entities with public service aspects. 16' NCAA
v. Board of Regents is the first case in which the Court has actually applied a
more lenient test.162 Although the decision was a loss for the NCAA, it was
a victory for other noncommercial organizations who will now have a
stronger argument to use in fending off antitrust challenges to their
regulations.
The Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents had an imme-
diate impact on college football, necessitating the total restructuring of the
"live college football television market" in the two months prior to the 1984
season. Despite the resultant chaos, 163 the developments during the 1984
160. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-96; see also supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
161. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17. Goldfarb applied antitrust law to self-regulatory organizations.
The Supreme Court noted that public service aspects of a restraint "may require that a particu-
lar practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently." Id.; see Note, supra note 6, at 665; see also supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
162. Some lower courts, however, have already adopted similarly lenient approaches. In
Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v. ABC, 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio 1980), the
court rejected a request for a preliminary injunction against the NCAA's television plan, on
the basis of a per se violation, because the plan operated in other than a purely commercial
context. In Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977), the court found that a self-regulatory association of dentists should
be evaluated under the rule of reason, and suggested that any evidence of positive public im-
pact will allow the practice to pass the rule of reason test.
163. The structure of televised college football had to be completely redesigned in the eight
weeks between the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents and the beginning of the
college football season. "You think the telephone business is messed up as a result of AT&T's
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season have provided a good indication of the long term impact of the
Supreme Court's decision. The initial reaction of many sports fans, colum-
nists,164 and apparently even Justice White, 165 was fear that greed would
overcome college football and that the drive for television revenues would
further professionalize, and possibly ruin, the college game. Even the trial
court noted that many of its witnesses were firmly convinced that it was
essential that the NCAA function as college football's exclusive agent,
although none could articulate reasons why the restrictions were neces-
sary.' 66 After assessing the preliminary results, however, it appears that
NCAA v. Board of Regents may, in the long term, prove to be very beneficial
for the networks, 6 7 the fans 68 and the game of college football. 6 9
In Board of Regents, the Court took notice that college basketball has
maintained its competitive balance without a restrictive television plan.'
70
The college basketball market was considered by many to be representative
court imposed divestiture? As John Toner, the NCAA's President, points out, 'At least the
judge gave AT&T three years.'" Asher, Behind the Scenes it's a Whole New Game, Seattle
Times, Aug. 26, 1984, at B12, col. 1.
164. See Kornheiser, College Football on Television Goes Overtime, Wash. Post, June 29,
1984, at Dl, col. 1. Kornheiser expressed the common fear that greed would dominate college
football and that the traditional powers would ignore all NCAA rules and prostitute what had
been an amateur sport in their drive for victories and television revenues available in an unreg-
ulated market. Id. at D3, cols. 5-6; see also Taafe, supra note 147, at 150.
165. See Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2975. Justice White noted a "tendency to profes-
sionalism in the dominant schools." Id. Also note that Justice White, a former All-American
running back at the University of Colorado, could likely be included within the "sports fans"
category in the preceding text.
166. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1309.
167. See Taafe, supra note 147, at 150-51.
168. Judge Burciaga stated that the interest of the viewers of college football television was
the most important consideration in this case. Board of Regents, No. 81-1209, slip op. at 8
(W.D. Okla., Oct. 31, 1984).
169. The decision, however, will have a negative effect on the NCAA's smaller schools in
Divisions II and III in that they will no longer be sharing the NCAA's planned revenues. See
Asher, Court Voids NCAA's TV Contracts, but Joy Doesn't Reign Supreme, Wash. Post, June
28, 1984, at Cl, col. 3; see also Barbash, Supreme Court Breaks NCAA Hold on Television
College Football Games, Wash. Post, June 18, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
170. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2970. College basketball has a much better competi-
tive balance than college football. It is difficult consistently to identify a "power elite" in
college basketball, at least partially because smaller schools with limited recruiting budgets can
recruit local athletes conscious of television exposure in local markets. Smaller colleges with a
regional following (e.g., James Madison University, Fresno State University, University of
North Carolina at Charlotte, Iona College, and the University of Texas at El Paso) have regu-
larly appeared in national rankings-and even won the national championship---a rarity in
college football. It is interesting that in the first year of increased regional broadcasts, as op-
posed to only national broadcasts that have had a tendency to boost the ratings of the tradi-
tional powers, Brigham Young, a lesser known school that played in a relatively weak
conference with only a regional following, was able to climb to the top of the wire service polls
and win the national championship.
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of how the college football market would function without the NCAA televi-
sion plan. 7 ' During its first season without the NCAA restraints, the col-
lege football television market indeed operated much like the college
basketball television market. Many more games were broadcast, both na-
tionally and regionally, with no relative increase in the coverage of college
football's traditional "power elite".172
In the wake of the Court's decision, the prices paid for college football
telecasts have plummeted, while the number of games televised has skyrock-
eted. 173 The NCAA's Division IA members, many of whom started the
CFA and expected to benefit from the decision, have not reaped the expected
windfall from the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia
suit. 17 Under the terms of the contract invalidated by Board of Regents, the
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and the American Broadcasting Com-
pany (ABC) would have paid $68.5 million for broadcast rights in 1984. But
the total amount paid for all post-decision major network and syndicated
football broadcast packages did not exceed $40 million. 175 Only a handful of
schools took home more money in 1984 than they would have under the old
NCAA plan. '
76
If examined only in terms of financial losses or gains, the Court's decision
was obviously a devastating blow to the ledgers of many institutions. It has
been widely feared, however, that the influx of television revenues would
professionalize college football. The income from football had become so
important to some schools that the pressure to win and to make profits made
the maintenance of academic standards and amateur principles a secondary
consideration. The reduction in revenues available in a competitive televi-
sion market hopefully will encourage some of the more profit-oriented
schools to again approach their football programs as important extracurricu-
lar activities rather than as fundraisers for their entire athletic program.' 77
The most beneficial development to come from the decision, however, will
be the increase in competitive balance. The formation of regional college
football markets should help college football in much the same way regional
171. See Barbash, supra note 169, at A10, col. 1.
172. See Taafe, Too Much of a Good Thing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 15, 1984, at 78-79.
173. Id. See Taafe, supra note 147, at 150-51.
174. See Taafe, supra note 147, at 150.
175. See Asher, supra note 146, at Cl, col. 3.
176. Id. at Cl, cols. 2-3.; see also Martzke, Viewers Not Tuned into Football Glut, USA
Today, Nov. 7, 1984, at 2C, col. I.
177. See Kornheiser, supra note 164, at D3, col. 6. The author expressed the hope that
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markets have helped college basketball. If it follows the college basketball
model, regional telecast packages will develop, as well as packages for cover-
age of local college games.' 78 The smaller Division IA and lAA members
should flourish under regional exposure, draw more spectators, retain more
local talent and thus become more competitive nationally. Indeed, because
of the high volume of local and regional television coverage, college basket-
ball has a much less definable "power elite" and a much better competitive
balance than does college football.
179
Although many college officials and athletic directors are understandably
unhappy over the prospect of losing television income, 80 the Court's deci-
sion in NCAA v. Board of Regents should eventually bring greater parity and
overall strength to the game of college football. It may also help return
some sanity to the business of college football. 81
III. CONCLUSION
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court outlined a relaxed rule
of reason standard for the evaluation of antitrust actions brought against
noncommercial organizations. The majority adopted a lower threshold for
access to a rule of reason analysis in these cases and, for the first time, con-
sidered affirmative defenses based on public service objectives rather than on
procompetitive market efficiencies. The majority wisely recognized that
agreements among entities with noneconomic goals need not be examined
under the same antitrust scrutiny as ventures undertaken by profit oriented
businesses. The decision may signal the establishment of a rational test that
will allow productive agreements in a noncommercial setting, while still as-
suring the invalidation of any agreements that have unjustified effects in
commercial markets.
In relation to future college football broadcasts, the networks, their adver-
tisers, and the fans were the major beneficiaries of the Court's decision.
Market forces are finally guiding college football television, creating efficien-
cies that were prevented during the 30 years of the NCAA's restrictive con-
trol. The colleges have bid against each other for access to national
television markets and are willing to take less money from the networks in
178. See Barbash, supra note 169; Martzke, supra note 176, 2C, col. 1.
179. See supra note 170.
180. See Taafe, supra note 147, at 151. Many colleges now regret that Oklahoma and
Georgia ever brought the suit against the NCAA. Washington State coach Jim Walden
summed up these sentiments: "I can understand glut and greed, but I don't understand stu-
pidity. I think this (lawsuit] will go down in history as one of the stupidest things ever done."
Id.
181. See supra note 177.
[Vol. 34:857
1985] NCAA v. Board of Regents 887
exchange for the exposure. As a result of the Court's decision, the market is
finally drawing the number of games that it can bear, networks are paying
fair prices for broadcasts, and advertisers are paying market-responsive fees
for air time.
The networks and other syndicated sports broadcasters and their advertis-
ers also won a legal victory that was entirely financed by NCAA members.
As is often the case with cartels, the most successful producers became
greedy and destroyed the artificial market restraints that had increased the
revenues of all the members. Although Georgia and Oklahoma's suit was
financially costly to the NCAA's member schools, their economic miscalcu-
lation should strengthen the game of college football and eventually increase
its following.
Thomas Scully

